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To assess the impact of tax-bene￿t policy changes on income distribution over time, we suggest
a methodology based on counterfactual simulations. We start by decomposing changes in inequal-
ity/poverty indices into three contributions: reforms of the tax-bene￿t structure (eligibility rules, tax
rate structure, etc.), changes in nominal levels of both market incomes and tax-bene￿t parameters (e.g.
bene￿t amounts, tax bands), and all other changes in the underlying population (including market income
inequality and demographic composition). Then, the decomposition helps to extract an absolute mea-
sure of the impact of tax-bene￿t changes on inequality when evaluated against a distributionally-neutral
benchmark, i.e. a situation where tax-bene￿t parameters are adjusted in line with income growth. We
apply this measure to assess recent policy changes in twelve European countries. Finally, the full decom-
position allows quantifying the relative role of policy changes compared to all other factors. We provide
an illustration on France and Ireland and check the sensitivity of the results to the decomposition order.
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How tax-bene￿t policies a⁄ect the distribution of income is a central question in economic and policy
analysis. For the policy maker, it is crucial to know whether actual reforms have achieved initial policy
objectives and how topical reforms may potentially a⁄ect income distribution in the future.2 Yet, the
evolution of poverty and inequality within a country is a complex process that combines changes in the
macroeconomic environment, in behaviours and in institutions, and all their possible interactions. It is
the role of economists to isolate and gauge the pure contribution of government policies to changes in
income distribution.
A traditional approach (Danziger, 1980) is to compare inequality with and without a speci￿c income
source, e.g. social transfers, and to repeat the assessment at di⁄erent points in time, possibly before and
after important changes in redistributive policy. This can be done for one instrument or alternatively
for the whole tax-bene￿t system, should household surveys provide all the necessary information about
disaggregated income components such as gross incomes, taxes and transfers. Some analyses also make
use of factor decomposition of inequality indices, as introduced and axiomatised by Shorrocks (1982) and
extended for instance in Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985).3 However, measuring the contribution of taxes and
transfers to overall inequality at di⁄erent points in time does not necessarily help to disentangle the pure
e⁄ect of policy changes from their interaction with the underlying population. For instance, increased
poverty due to rising unemployment may be partly o⁄set by automatic increase in social assistance. It
is thus di¢ cult to distinguish this safety net e⁄ect from possible policy changes, e.g. an increase in the
generosity of social transfers, as both e⁄ects make this instrument appear more redistributive in the later
period.4
A related di¢ culty holds in the fact that a great deal of policy making concerns the uprating of welfare
payments, tax bands and other monetary parameters in line ￿or not ￿with actual changes in prices or
wages. For instance, a relatively faster growth in high incomes compare to low incomes can generate
an increase in tax payments that makes the tax system appear more redistributive. Yet, this automatic
￿ stabilizer e⁄ect￿occurs if the tax bands of upper brackets are not uprated, or are uprated at a lower
2In particular, the EU￿ s Lisbon agenda requires the assessment of policy changes at national levels in order to understand
how National Action Plans achieve their objectives in the light of social indicators as those ￿xed at Laeken in 2001 (Atkinson
et al., 2002).
3Several variants of these approaches have been used. See for instance Jenkins (1995) for the evolution of inequality in
the UK between 1971 and 1986.
4This issue has naturally received some attention in the literature on tax progressivity, starting with the statement of
Musgrave and Thin (1948, p. 510) that ￿[...]the less equal the distribution of income before tax, the more potent will be a
(given) progressive tax structure in equalizing income￿. Lambert and Pf￿hler (1992) and Milanovic (1994) have discussed
to what extent this prediction has any signi￿cance by examining the e⁄ect of pre-tax distributional change on progressivity
comparisons. Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) suggest a reformulation of local progression comparisons (Jakobsson, 1976,
Kakwani, 1977) when taking into account the di⁄erences over time (or across countries) in pre-tax inequality. While this
approach is helpful in many ways, it focuses on income taxation, accounts only for synthetic changes in pre-tax income
distribution and may be of limited practicality when it comes to the evaluation of actual tax-bene￿t reforms using a wide
range of inequality and poverty measures.
1pace than the growth in high incomes. It is therefore important to evaluate policy changes in the light
of a relevant benchmark, as discussed by Callan et al. (2006).
The present paper suggests a decomposition methodology which helps on previous counts. It is based
on the construction of appropriate counterfactual distributions using tax-bene￿t microsimulation.5 The
change in the distribution of disposable income ￿summarized by poverty or inequality measures ￿is
decomposed into three types of e⁄ects: the change in tax-bene￿t policy structure, the change in the
nominal levels of policy parameters relatively to change in income levels, and other changes not directly
linked to tax-bene￿t policies. The last e⁄ect includes changes in the distribution of gross income, its
composition between di⁄erent sources (capital income, labour income, replacement income, etc.), as well
as changes in the demographic structure.
Firstly, we extract from this decomposition a measure of the absolute e⁄ect of policy reforms, i.e.
the e⁄ect obtained when holding the underlying population constant. This policy impact is assessed
against a distributionally neutral benchmark, i.e. a situation where tax-bene￿t monetary parameters are
nominally adjusted in line with income growth. This way, we capture not only the distributional e⁄ect
of structural policy reforms but also that of possible lack of adjustment of welfare payment, thresholds
of tax brackets, etc. This approach is applied to assess policy changes in ten European countries for the
period 1998-2001, in France for 1995-2001 and in Ireland for 1994-2000.
Secondly, we use the full decomposition to quantify the relative role of policy changes compared to
other changes in the underlying population (gross income, demographics, etc.).6 The idea is very similar
to a Oaxaca-Blinder type of decomposition into price and characteristic e⁄ects. Here, the price e⁄ect
is the change in the tax-bene￿t system over time, holding gross income and household characteristics
constant. We conduct this exercise on France 1995-2001 and Ireland 1994-2000; we ￿nd that some of
the results are robust with respect to the decomposition method, i.e. whether counterfactuals of policy
changes are based on initial or ￿nal data. Others vary with the method ￿especially for Ireland where
important changes take place ￿in which case the need for regularly updated income survey data, or
representative panel data, is emphasised.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the decomposition approach. Section 3
describes brie￿ y the data. Section 4 reports the absolute e⁄ects of policy change on inequality in twelve
European countries. Section 5 focuses on France and Ireland to gauge the relative e⁄ect of policy changes
compared to other factors. Section 6 concludes.
5Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) suggest a comprehensive exposition about microsimulation. Atkinson (2005) em-
phasizes the role of counterfactual exercises to understand the role of social policies in Europe. An excellent example of
counterfactual analysis is the study of Clark and Leicester (2004) who gauge the contribution of British tax-bene￿t reforms
to the growth in income inequality during the 1980s and 1990s.
6A few studies, like Nolan and Maitre (2000) for Ireland, suggest a meticulous investigation of policy changes and the way
they interact with other factors to explain inequality changes. The present approach provides a framework to disentangle
these e⁄ects and to quantify the relative contribution of policy changes to variations in income distribution.
22 A Decomposition Approach
2.1 Overview and De￿nitions
We ￿rst introduce some notations and terminology. We denote by household ￿ gross income￿the total
amount of capital, labour and replacement incomes (including unemployment bene￿ts and pensions)
before taxes and bene￿ts. ￿ Disposable income￿is the household income that remains after payment of
taxes/social contributions and receipt of all transfers; in the context of microsimulation studies, this is
the relevant concept for measurement of poverty and inequality.
The distribution of disposable income is represented hereafter as a transformation di(pj;yl) of the
underlying population yl:7 The distribution and nominal level of gross income as well as other character-
istics like demographics are those of year l. We also consider the possibility to nominally adjust incomes
to levels of year k using a parameter ￿k. That is, ￿kyl retains the structural characteristics of year l
data (gross income inequality, demographics, etc.) but adopts the nominal level prevailing in year k. The
choice of parameter ￿k is discussed extensively in the next section.
Implicit in transformation di is the e⁄ect of the tax-bene￿t system on households with di⁄erent gross
incomes (and di⁄erent demographic characteristics). Disposable income thus depends on tax-bene￿t rules
and non-monetary parameters (e.g. tax rates); in the above notations, this ￿ policy structure￿is that of
year i. It also depends on pj, the set of monetary parameters for tax-bene￿t calculations (e.g. maximum
bene￿t amounts, threshold level of tax brackets, etc.). The nominal level of these tax-bene￿t parameters
is that of year j.
With the notations above, we can easily represent counterfactual situations. For instance, d0(p1;￿1y0)
represents disposable incomes when nominal levels of parameters and gross incomes are those of year 1
while the de￿nition of tax-bene￿t rules and population characteristics (gross income distribution, demo-
graphics, etc.) are those of year 0. We are interested in inequality/poverty indices computed from the
(simulated) distribution of disposable income for a given year or for counterfactual situations. Denote G




of the distribution of disposable
income.
We shall assume that the simulated distribution of disposable income dh(ph;yh) for a given year h
is the true distribution for that year. Naturally, there are limits to this assumption. Mantovani and
Sutherland (2003) discuss the robustness of the simulations using the European model EUROMOD by
comparing simulated and o¢ cial measures of income distribution for years 1998 and 2001. Comparability
is not easy since other sources of information about income distribution may use di⁄erent de￿nitions of
7Generally speaking, yl can be thought of as a matrix where each line represents a household by a vector of characteristics,
including various incomes, socio-demographic characteristics, etc. However, we refer to it as a simple income vector in the
following since income distribution is the main dimension of interest in this study. These are pure notational subtleties
since microsimulation models do account for all relevant dimensions (type of income, treatment of family size, etc.) when
computing disposable income.
3equivalence scales, di⁄erent datasets and years, incorporate in-kind bene￿ts, etc. There are, however,
some systematic di⁄erences between microsimulation estimates and those based directly on survey mea-
sures. In particular, simulations do not take into account possible non-take-up of social bene￿ts, which
leads to underestimation of poverty (see Hancock et al., 2003, for take-up correction within microsimu-
lation). In the following empirical application (Section 4), we shall validate our results against external
sources.
Also, it must be kept in mind that tax-bene￿t changes also a⁄ect the distribution of gross income and
demographics by changing incentives to work, save, have children, marry, etc. This study provides a ￿rst
step in the assessment of pure policy e⁄ects and therefore ignores these ￿ indirect￿or secondary e⁄ects.8
2.2 Decomposition










This change in the distribution of disposable income ￿as summarized by index G ￿can be decomposed
into the contribution of the change in the tax-bene￿t policy (￿ policy e⁄ect￿ ) and the contribution of other
factors like variations in the underlying gross income distribution, in demographics, etc. (￿ data e⁄ect￿ ).
Remark that a straightforward application of the initial (￿nal) policy on the ￿nal (initial) data may not





















= (data e⁄ect conditional on policy 1) + (policy e⁄ect conditional on data 0)
This decomposition might be acceptable as a ￿rst approximation if initial and ￿nal years are close enough.
However, the term d1(p1;y0) indicates that we apply the system of year 1 to the data of year 0, ignoring the
fact new monetary parameters (bene￿t amounts, levels of tax allowance, etc.) may have been adjusted to
account to some extent for price and wage in￿ ation over the period. For instance, the eligibility threshold
of social bene￿ts may have been adjusted in line with wage in￿ ation; in this case, the new system will
appear more redistributive than it is if assessed on data 0 (that is, on lower gross income levels). It
is thus necessary to evaluate the policy changes in the light of nominally adjusted data (see Callan et
al., 2006). To do so, we apply to both monetary parameters and income levels of year 0 the coe¢ cient
￿1. The counterfactual ￿1y0 then corresponds to the distribution (and composition) of year 0 incomes
nominally adjusted to year 1. As for parameters, the nominally adjusted schedule is written ￿1p0. This
is not equivalent to p1, that represents the actual set of parameters in year 1, i.e. as decided by the
authorities. In e⁄ect, as stated above, the actual parameters are not necessarily adjusted in line with
8Nonetheless, the suggested approach could well be combined with behavioural models; in particular, it could incorporate
labour supply responses in a partial equilibrium (see, among others, Creedy et al., 2006) or more complex e⁄ects in a CGE
framework. We ignore these e⁄ects and isolate key issues which would also arise in such wider framework.
4progression in price or wages. The default option for what happens to welfare payment rates and tax
bands (the ￿ opening budget￿ ) varies a lot across countries.9

































(change in nominal levels)
where the last term extracts the e⁄ect of levelling up both the initial tax-bene￿t monetary parameters
and the initial incomes. Conditional on the policy structure of year 0, and for nominal levels of year 1,
the second term corresponds to the change in data (underlying distribution of gross income, demographic
structure, etc.). The ￿rst term captures the e⁄ect of the tax-policy change over the period, conditional
on ￿nal year data. Interestingly, and in line with our objective, it re￿ ects the change in policy structure
(d0 to d1) but also the actual change in nominal levels of monetary parameters (p1) compared to a
distributionally neutral situation where monetary parameters are exactly in line with average income
growth over the period (￿1p0).
We also introduce the alternative decomposition where the e⁄ect of policy changes is conditional on
initial rather than ￿nal data. Here too, policy changes combine structural changes (from d0 to d1) and
parameter changes (from ￿1p0 to p1). Therefore, the policy e⁄ect must be conditional on the initial data

































(change in nominal levels)
where the third term is unchanged compared to (1). The ￿rst term is the e⁄ect of other changes (gross
income distribution, demographics, etc.) conditional on the policy structure and nominal levels of the
￿nal period.
We ￿nally discuss the choice of parameter ￿. Notice ￿rst that governments have many options to
uprate tax-bene￿t parameters, as mentioned above. Three of them are fairly standard: (1) no uprating,
(2) uprating according to the level of price in￿ ation, (3) uprating according to the level of wage in￿ ation.
When it comes to assessing the distributional impacts of actual practices, price-indexation seems an
appealing and intuitive benchmark (see, for instance, Mitrusi and Poterba, 2000). However, Callan et al.
(2006) argue that it may not be the appropriate one. For instance, the relative situation of the poorest
would worsen in this case if real wages increase while welfare payments are held constant in real terms
9With non-indexation of tax brackets in progressive systems, income growth generates some ￿scal drag (the so-called
￿ bracket creep￿as studied by Immervoll, 2005). In contrast, some countries have elements of price and/or wage indexation
built into parts of the tax and welfare code. In the UK, for example, key parameters in the income tax code are indexed to
changes in the retail price index.
5(i.e. are indexed in line with price in￿ ation). Callan et al. (2006) show that wage indexation gives rise to
similar growth in real incomes across the income distribution, and is therefore a distributionally-neutral
benchmark against which actual policy changes can be evaluated.10 We opt here for a very similar
backdrop where ￿ is de￿ned as the actual change in average gross income levels between the years 0
and 1. This choice simply re￿ ects the fact that parameter ￿ is also used to nominally adjust the initial
data (￿1y0) in order to assess the ￿ data e⁄ect￿in the above decompositions. For this purpose, it seems
reasonable that y1 and the counterfactual population ￿1y0 have the same average gross income.11
2.3 Homogeneity Property and Simpli￿cation
We argue that the tax-bene￿t system is often linearly homogenous,12 that is:
di(￿pj;￿yl) = ￿di(pj;yl):
Clearly, the adaptation of tax rules following the introduction of the Euro has been straightforward
in most EU countries. This property can be illustrated by looking at an over-simpli￿ed system that
captures the essence of most tax-bene￿t systems. Assume that the ￿rst instrument is a progressive tax
schedule composed of two brackets with marginal rates tz and thresholds Hz (z = 1;2). A universal
child bene￿t grants an amount C for each child if household gross income is lower than a threshold F.
Finally, a minimum income is computed as a basic income B minus a proportion ￿ of other incomes.
Then disposable income of a household with income y and x children is:
d = c + max(0;B ￿ ￿c)
with c = y ￿ f(y ￿ H2)t2 + (H2 ￿ H1)t1g + 1(y < F)xC
Homogeneity is straightforward when multiplying income y and all monetary parameters B;H2;H1;F
and C by the same coe¢ cient.
Consequently, a simultaneous change in nominal levels of both incomes and parameters should not
a⁄ect the relative location of households in the distribution of disposable income. Then, for well-behaved
measures G of income distribution which do not change with nominal levels, the function G ￿ d should










10Similar choices are made in Thoresen (2004) and Clark and Leicester (2004) who thoroughly analyze tax reforms in
Norway and the UK respectively.
11It would be possible to check the sensitivity of the absolute policy e⁄ect to the indexation choice (income growth
or in￿ation), as done in Clark and Leicester (2004). However, it would not make much sense, in our framework, to use
price indexation. This choice would imply that the ￿ data e⁄ect￿in (1) or (2) captures more than the change in underlying
population (gross income inequality, demographic structure, etc.). In e⁄ect, it would also account for the di⁄erence between
price-indexed incomes (￿1y0) and actual incomes of the ￿nal period (y1), introducing arti￿cial di⁄erences between actual
and counterfactual data.
12An interesting exception in Europe is the quadratic form of the German income tax system.














































Then the ￿rst term of (I) and the second of (II) are measures of the absolute e⁄ect of the policy change
on disposable income distribution against a distributionally-neutral situation. On practical grounds, the
￿rst measure requires the knowledge of data 1 while the second requires data 0. Typically, microsimulation
studies use cross-sections of the initial year (year of data collection) while data of the ￿nal year are not
available. This can be due to infrequency of data collection or simply the fact that period 1 corresponds
to future budgets or hypothetical systems. In consequence, our ￿rst empirical exercise (Section 4) will










using base period data only.
3 Data and Simulation
Simulations for all countries except France and Ireland are performed using the tax-bene￿t calculator
EUROMOD. This model has been designed to simulate the tax-bene￿t systems of the EU-15 countries.
For each country, it computes all direct taxes and monetary transfers, and hence disposable income, for
all the households of a representative dataset (see description in Sutherland, 2001). The choice of initial
system (1998) and ￿nal system (2001) is constrained by what is made available for several countries
in the latest version of EUROMOD (system 2003 is however progressively implemented). In addition,
we simulate the French system in 1995 and 2001 using the microsimulation model SYSIFF, described
in Bargain and Terraz (2001) and based on the Household Budget Survey made available by INSEE.
Simulations of the Irish system for 1994 and 2000 are based on the model SWITCH, described in Callan
et al. (1996), and rely on the Living in Ireland Survey made available by the Economic and Social
Research Institute.
The data used to assess policy e⁄ects in the next Section are described in Table 1. As aforementioned,
the absolute measure of the policy e⁄ect using (II) requires data for the initial period only, that is, 1995
13Simulations con￿rm that Lorenz curves obtained using d0(p0;y0) and d0(￿1p0;￿1y0)) overlap. This result naturally
requires the use of a unique factor on all types of incomes (the growth in average gross income here). If di⁄erentiated ￿
coe¢ cients were used for each income source (e.g. labour income, pensions, etc.), the distribution of gross income would
change, i.e. G(￿1y0) 6= G(y0):
7for France, 1994 for Ireland and 1998 for all the other countries. As indicated in Table 1, however,
the year of collection matches the initial year of simulation only for Austria, Finland, Germany, France
and Ireland. For other countries, datasets are a bit older so that the previous methodology cannot be
applied perfectly. For those, 1998 data are obtained by updating monetary variables using di⁄erentiated
coe¢ cients for di⁄erent income sources ￿but necessarily assuming that there were no other changes (in
gross income composition and distribution, in demographic structure, etc.) between the two years. The
last column provides the updating coe¢ cient ￿1 that allows nominal adjustment between years 0 and 1
for all countries as previously described. It is calculated as the growth rate of average gross income over
the relevant period.
The second exercise presented in Section 5 consists in applying the full decompositions to capture the
relative e⁄ect of policy changes. In this case, decompositions (I) and (II) require data for both initial
and ￿nal periods. For that purpose, we focus on France and Ireland for which such data are available.
Initial data for France (1995) and Ireland (1994) are described in Table 1. In addition, we use the French
Household Budget Survey 2001, which contains 25,803 observations, and the Living in Ireland Survey
2000, which contains 11,450 observations.









Austria European Community Household Panel 1998 7,386 3,238,520 5.7%
Belgium Panel Survey on Belgium Households 1997 7,057 4,028,723 7.2%
Denmark European Community Household Panel 1995 7,044 2,531,183 6.2%
France Household Budget Survey 1994/5 29,158 23,487,099 14.2%
Finland Income Distribution Survey 1998 25,010 2,355,000 7.4%
Germany German Socio-Economic Panel 1998 18,227 38,259,778 10.7%
Greece European Community Household Panel 1995 15,062 3,720,085 15.5%
Ireland Living in Ireland Survey 1994 14,585 1,130,695 36.1%
Italy Survey of Households Income and Wealth 1996 23,924 19,816,115 14.2%
Portugal European Community Household Panel 1996 14,468 3,211,572 9.8%
Spain European Community Household Panel 1996 18,991 12,347,454 23.9%
UK Family Expenditure Survey 1995/6 16,586 24,490,138 6.8%
* This factor is computed for the period 1998-2001, except for Ireland (1994-2000) and France (1995-2001).
4 Absolute E⁄ect of Tax-Bene￿t Policies
Measure G could be chosen among many inequality and poverty indices. In this section, we simply use
the Gini coe¢ cient to illustrate the methodology suggested above. Results are presented in Table 2. The













, is obtained by grossing up the data using
coe¢ cient ￿1. As explained above, the absolute measure captures the distributional impact of changes
8in policy structure and the actual adjustments in monetary parameters compared to adjustments in line
with the growth of average gross incomes. The period considered is 1998-2001 for all countries except
France and Ireland.
First of all, the Gini for period 0, as calculated using microsimulation models, are broadly in line with
other ￿ndings as indicated by the comparison of the ￿rst and last columns of Table 2. Di⁄erences may
be due to the non take-up of certain bene￿ts in microsimulation models, the use of di⁄erent equivalence
scales, the imputation of rental values or other choices made when computing inequality indices (see the
discussion and extensive comparison between EUROMOD and the ECHP in Mantovani and Sutherland,
2003).
Then, our results point out towards a substantial equalising e⁄ect of policy changes in Greece and
the UK. This is con￿rmed by Callan et al. (2006) who ￿nd larger gains for the lower quintiles and in
particular the ￿rst one in both countries. In Greece the boost to the low income group is associated with
marked increases in real terms of certain retirement bene￿ts (social pensions, farmers￿basic pension and
pensioner social solidarity bene￿t), coupled with changes in the policy structure (e.g. introduction of a
social contribution rebate for low earners in 2000). For the UK, the main policy factors driving these
changes were structural developments, particularly the extension in 1999 of the refundable tax credit for
low-earner families with children. It may also re￿ ect substantial nominal adjustments: council taxes have
been regularly raised above in￿ ation, a⁄ecting more families with high incomes, and income support for
pensioners has been increased.14
In contrast, policy changes in Finland and Ireland have contributed to increase inequalities. In
Finland, this is partly the result of a reduction in the progressivity of the tax system. In e⁄ect, the
￿ at-rate State tax has been increased while the progressive municipal taxation was decreased. Results
for Ireland ￿as well as for France ￿are explained in detailed in the next Section. In both countries, they
cover a larger period than the 3-year span 1998-2001 used for other countries, which may partly explain
that the change for Ireland is the largest in magnitude. Interestingly, F￿rster and d￿ Ercole (2005) study
the overall change in the Gini during 1994-1999, which can be compared to the change in inequality due
to the sole policy e⁄ects as captured here for a similar period. It turns out that the equalising trend for
France is reported in both studies while results are complete opposite for Ireland. Precisely, F￿rster and
d￿ Ercole report a signi￿cant decrease in inequality while we ￿nd that recent Irish policy developments
must have contributed to increase the Gini. This means that the policy e⁄ect and other factors must
play in the same direction in France but in opposite ways in Ireland, a result which is con￿rmed and
more precisely quanti￿ed in the next Section.
14See the in-depth analysis of Brewer et al. (2004) who con￿rm the equalizing e⁄ect of the working family tax credit
and especially its e⁄ect poverty reduction among children and pensioners. They indicate, however, that actual inequality
has decreased only slightly and that the redistributive measures of the Labour government have reduced the increase in
inequality that would have occurred otherwise.
9Table 2: Absolute E⁄ect on Inequality of the Change in Tax-bene￿t System
Country






Austria 24.5 24.2 -0.3 -1.1% Dennis and Guio (2003) 26
Belgium 25.3 25.3 0.0 0.1% Socio-Economic Panel 97 24.8
Denmark 25.4 25.1 -0.3 -1.2% Danish register data 97 25.7
France 29.9 29.4 -0.5 -1.8% ECHP, Eurostat, 1995 30
Finland 25.8 26.5 0.7 2.8% Riihelä et al. (2005) 26
Germany 26.5 26.6 0.1 0.4% Dennis and Guio (2003) 25
Greece 35.3 34.2 -1.1 -3.0% Dennis and Guio (2003) 34
Ireland 29.0 30.4 1.4 4.8% Dennis and Guio (2003) 32
Italy 35.1 34.7 -0.4 -1.1% Italian Household Budget 98 34.3
Portugal 38.1 38.6 0.5 1.2% Dennis and Guio (2003) 36
Spain 33.1 33.7 0.5 1.6% Dennis and Guio (2003) 33
UK 31.9 30.7 -1.1 -3.6% Dennis and Guio (2003) 32
Gini are based on equivalized income using the modified OECD scale (zeros are bottom-coded as 10E-1)
Period 0 is 1998 for all countries except Ireland (1994) and France (1995); period 1 is 2001 for all countries except Ireland (2000)
* Disposable incomes for period 1 are simulated on the basis of period 0 incomes, nominally adjusted to period 1.
Gini from other sources**
** Measures in Dennis and Guio (2003) are based on the ECHP for 1998 incomes; measures based on Danish register Data 1997 are published in the Luxembourg Income Study; those from
'Italian Household Budgets 1998' are published by the Bank of Italy (2000).
Gini on disposable income
5 Relative E⁄ect of Tax-bene￿t Policies: France and Ireland
In this section, we decompose the role of policy changes versus other factors in explaining changes in
income distribution. Other factors are complex, including changes in the macroeconomic environment,
the e⁄ect of other policies (unemployment bene￿ts, minimum wage, etc.) and the indirect e⁄ect of tax-
bene￿t policies via behavioural responses. We apply both decompositions I and II on France (period
1995-2001) and Ireland (period 1994-2000).
Table 3 presents the results for a battery of indicators. Inequality, as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient
and the Atkinson index (" = 0:5) has slightly decreased in France, by between 2 and 4.5 per cent. In
Ireland, there is a somewhat greater fall (between 4 and 8 per cent).15 The two countries diverge when
higher aversion to inequality is assumed: the Atkinson index (" = 1:5) increases in Ireland and decreases in
France. This re￿ ects that income growth has been more homogenous in France while inequality reduction
has occurred mostly within the second half of the distribution in Ireland. This is con￿rmed by the ratio
of upper incomes to median, which decreases in Ireland while the gap between upper and lower incomes
widens. In addition, the headcount ratio with poverty line at 60% of the median falls slightly in France
but rises by around 50% in Ireland.
15Table 2 shows that the simulated Gini for France is close to the measure obtained using the ECHP. It is however
overstated compared to measures using the tax revenue data (INSEE-DGI, enquete Revenus Fiscaux, 1996), giving a Gini
around 0.27. For Ireland, a Gini of 0.29 in the initial period is lower than measures from the ECHP (0.32) and from the raw
data in the Living in Ireland Survey (0.33), probably re￿ecting the extent of unclaimed bene￿t in the actual data. Trends
observed in Table 3 are nonetheless con￿rmed by these other sources.
10What is the relative role of tax-bene￿t policy and of other factors in these developments? In France,
policy changes explain most of the change in inequality and poverty measures; this result is con￿rmed
using either decomposition. Other factors play a small role, often not signi￿cant or with a diverging
sign depending on the index under consideration; in particular, they contribute to an increase in the
headcount ratio with a line at 60% of the median but to a decrease in the headcount ratio with line at
50% (not represented) and in the Atkinson index with " = 1:5.
There was little policy change in the late 1990s and welfare payment rates have been raised only
after 1997 to catch up with average income (the most noticeable increase concerns the unemployment
assistance, Allocation de SolidaritØ SpØci￿que, in 1998). It seems that the trend captured in our results
rather stems from structural changes of years 2000-2001, and in particular the reform of housing bene￿ts
and the introduction of a modest refundable tax credit for low-wage individuals, two measures that have
bene￿ted primarily to the lowest part of the distribution (see CERC, 2006). Outside of tax-bene￿t policy,
key factors have been the economic recovery of the 1997-2001 period and declining unemployment (from
11.3% in 1995 down to 8.8% in 2001). Recent growth has taken some time to trickle down to poverty
levels (see the detailed analyses in CERC, 2006, and Demailly and Raynaud, 2006). The number of people
on welfare (￿ RMI￿recipients) continued to climb until 1999 then decreased from 1,12 million in 1999 to
1.05 in 2001. Moreover, wage moderation has accompanied the implementation of the new legislation on
reduced working time in 2001.
While decompositions I and II lead to similar conclusions in France, results seem more sensitive to the
method for Ireland. This is primarily due the fact that e⁄ects are much larger in this country, following
the dramatic change in the economy in the late 1990s and the very large fall in unemployment rate (from
15% to 5% over the period). Nevertheless, some key results are robust with respect to the choice of
decomposition method. The Gini and Atkinson indices, along with the percentile ratios P90/P10 and
P50/P10, con￿rm that the direct in￿ uence of policy changes over the period was to increase inequality
while other factors tended to decrease it. Both policy changes and other e⁄ects contribute to increase
the head count, poverty gap ratio and weighted poverty gap ratio with poverty line at 60% median as
well as the Atkinson index with high inequality aversion.
As far as policy changes are concerned, income tax cuts have clearly reduced the redistributive e⁄ect
of the system and contributed to widen the gap between the second half of the distribution and the
bottom, as indicated by the percentile ratios. In addition, welfare payment rates have failed to keep pace
with the growth in labour income so that the relative position of the poorest disimproved in the second
half of 1990s, as translated by poverty trends.16
As for other factors, not directly due to taxes and bene￿ts, it turns out that the sharp fall in unem-
ployment has acted to reduce most of the inequality measures. There is less indication of the widening
in earnings dispersion which accompanied the rapid economic growth in the 1990s. As noted by Nolan
and Maitre (2000), this trend has been primarily driven by relatively rapid increases for those at the very
16Nolan and Maitre (2000) show that the share of social transfers declined substantially in the period 1994-1997, con￿rming
that social welfare support rates lagged behind the very rapid pace of growth in earnings.
11top of the distribution, which is not captured by the P90 percentile reported here. According to Nolan
and Maitre, there was no indication that the bottom has been falling behind the median, as con￿rmed
here by the quasi-stagnation of the P50/P10 ratio for ￿ other e⁄ects￿ . When the focus is on the poorest,
however, the impact of these other factors was to raise the poverty indices (and the Akinson index with
" = 1:5). Instances where falling unemployment has been associated with a rise in the risk of relative
poverty have also been found in Immervoll et al. (2005a).
Table 3: Changes in Income Distribution over Time: Decomposition between Policy E⁄ects and Other
Factors










Gini (%) 29.0 27.7 -1.3 0.7 -2.0 1.4 -2.7
Atkinson 0.5 6.7 6.2 -0.5 0.3 -0.8 0.7 -1.2
Atkinson 1.5 18.3 20.6 2.3 1.0 1.3 2.0 0.3
P90/P10 3.5 3.8 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.5 -0.3
P90/P50 2.0 1.9 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
P50/P10 1.7 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0
FGT0(%) 13.4 19.8 6.4 2.8 3.6 6.0 0.5
FGT1(%) 1.5 4.4 2.9 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.2
FGT2(%) 0.4 1.5 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.7
France 1995-2001
Gini (%) 29.9 29.2 -0.7 -0.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.1
Atkinson 0.5 7.4 7.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.1
Atkinson 1.5 20.9 19.8 -1.2 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6
P90/P10 3.5 3.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
P90/P50 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
P50/P10 1.8 1.7 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
FGT0(%) 13.3 12.7 -0.6 -1.5 1.0 -1.0 0.5
FGT1(%) 2.8 2.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 -0.1
FGT2(%) 1.0 0.9 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Decomposition I Decomposition II
The tax-benefit policy effect is measured on the basis of data at period 0 (resp. 1) in decomposition I (resp. II). Income is equivalised using the modified OECD scale. Poverty lines are
fixed at 60% of the median.
6 Concluding Comments
This paper suggests a decomposition of the trends in inequality and poverty into the contribution directly
due to tax-bene￿t policy changes and the contribution of other factors, including changes in gross income
distribution. This allows us to establish an absolute measure of the policy e⁄ect in which the benchmark
is distributionally neutral, i.e. in line with income growth over the period. Policy changes which do
12not adjust monetary tax-bene￿t parameters along these lines may a⁄ect (disposable income) inequality.
While not unique, the measure proposed has the merit not requiring the data for the ￿nal year while
being consistent with the suggested decomposition.
We also apply the full decomposition to two countries. We ￿nd that policy changes have had important
in￿ uences in both Ireland and in France over the late 1990s. For France, policy impacts have tended to
equalize incomes and reduce relative income poverty; for Ireland, the reverse is the case. In the Irish
case, overall inequality falls because of other factors, including changes in the distribution of gross income
as unemployment fell sharply. For France, policy changes were the main driving force in the change in
inequality over this period. These results show the value of evaluating policy reforms in conjunction
with other structural changes in the population if their in￿ uence on inequality is to be understood and
measured accurately.
The objective of the analysis suggested for France and Ireland was primarily illustrative of the sug-
gested methodology. Further research should focus on at least two aspects. First, a closer analysis of
policy impacts would require the use of more regular (ideally, annual) data in order to assess more pre-
cisely the role of speci￿c reforms, years after years, as performed for instance in Clark and Leicester
(2004). Second, results are potentially sensitive to the decomposition method, i.e. either based on the
initial or the ￿nal underlying population. This is not the case for France, where overall e⁄ects are small,
but some di⁄erences have been observed for Ireland and deserve further investigation. In particular, the
regressive e⁄ect of recent policy changes appears larger in absolute terms when estimated on the more
equal distribution of gross income (i.e. on the ￿nal year using decomposition II).
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